Abstract-The post-crisis reforms to the global financial system may serve us well if the next crisis is 2008 revisited. But of course it won't be. So instead of preparing to fight the last war, this paper analyses the five major changes in the global financial system in the past 40 years, and explores potential regulatory responses that could make the system more stable and resilient. These changes include (i) the globalisation of the global financial system; (ii) the legalisation of financial gambling; (iii) the rise in algorithmic and high frequency trading and in dark pools; (iv) the fundamental changes in banks and bankers; and (v) the rise in the role and power of ratings agencies. The potential responses to these changes include i) a sovereign bankruptcy regime; (ii) higher mandated capital levels for banks; (iii) levies on banks; (iv) a financial transactions tax; (v) rigorous regulation of high frequency trading and dark pools; and (vi) removing the conflict in the role of the ratings agencies.
Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 should have caused a deep and profound rethinking of how capital markets work and are regulated, and of financial law more generally. The great
The world of banking has changed profoundly in the past 40 years, but because the changes have been incremental, few people appreciate their scope and scale. This paper selects 40 years as the time frame as in 1971 the US went off the gold standard, the system put in place at Bretton Woods to keep finance national began to unravel, and international financial markets began to globalise.
The massive changes in the past 40 years in what banks do and who works within them are two factors that lie at the heart of the GFC. Banking is a different industry than it was. It is necessary to assess how the international financial system has changed fundamentally in the past 40 years, and respond to these changes. Therefore, this article starts with an overview of recent internationally mandated reforms. These comprise principally: These are eight good reforms, 10 however, the issue with the response to the GFC has not been that it is wrong-headed, but simply that it has not gone far enough to respond to the profound changes in banking and capital markets of the past 40 years. The reforms, in the main, respond directly to the causes of the GFC and it is entirely understandable that a political process responds in this way to a crisis, ie try to identify what caused the crisis and work to prevent it happening again. However, this is precisely what defence planners are derided for: preparing to fight the last war.
There will be another major financial crisis in the next decade or two, as the history of the last 40 years strongly suggests, and it almost certainly won't be like the GFC. Another major crisis will almost certainly occur because the current globalised international financial system operates without a global financial regulator, a global lender of last resort or a global sovereign bankruptcy regime, and to be stable all national systems require a financial regulator, lender of last resort and bankruptcy regime. 11 These regulatory lacuna are unsurprising as Keynes and White in 1943 designed the post-war financial architecture to promote international trade but keep finance essentially national. So once we moved to a truly international financial system we needed new regulatory institutions which were missing, and while we have sought to provide such a regulatory superstructure through the Bank for International Settlements, Financial Stability Board and other such bodies, these are in no way an adequate replacement for the very great powers, formal and informal, of the financial regulator that all national financial systems need to be stable.
11 RP Buckley, ' How the International Financial System, to Its Detriment, Differs from National Systems, and What We Can We Do About It' (2004) 34 UHKLJ 321. Many commentators assume the IMF is the international lender of last resort, but the four elements of Bagehot's classic prescription for a lender of last resort are that it is able to make available large amounts of capital, quickly, at high interest rates and on good security: W Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (Scribner, Armstrong & Co 1873). However, the IMF lacks the resources to make available sufficiently large volumes of capital to quell market fears, often struggles to act quickly, doesn't for political reasons charge interest rates high enough to limit moral hazard, and sovereign borrowers typically lack the capacity to give good security over sufficient assets beyond their borders. So while much has changed since Bagehot wrote Lombard Street, if the IMF is truly to serve as a lender of last resort, we probably need to put in place some very extensive swap lines between national central banks that can be triggered quickly purely by the IMF, and even then, we are left with some very difficult to solve moral hazard problems with the IMF as initiator of those credit lines.
national. If they had designed a globalised financial system, they would almost certainly have created a global financial regulator, a global lender of last resort, and a global sovereign bankruptcy scheme, for, as has been discussed, no national financial system is able to operate without these institutions. 13 The system of financial regulation that has developed ad hoc in recent decades involving the Basel Committee, the Bank for International Settlements, the FSB and many other institutions, is a response to the absence of a global central bank and global financial regulator.
The system that has developed is primarily one of 'soft law' as the rules are made at the international level and implemented nationally.
B. The Legalisation of Financial Gambling
The Gaming Act 1845 in the United Kingdom made gaming houses illegal and gaming or wagering agreements unenforceable. For over a century, courts in all these countries took the view that derivatives contracts (as they came later to be known) entered into by at least one party for hedging purposes were valid under these enactments, but derivatives entered merely to place a bet on the price of something were invalid and unenforceable. 17 Accordingly, a contract by which a farmer locked in a price for their wheat crop when harvested, or by which an airline guaranteed a future price for jet fuel, were both valid, but a contract by which a speculator bet on future wheat or fuel prices was not.
18
Over time, legislatures began to exempt derivatives contracts from the application of these laws. CFMA was a 'sudden and wholesale removal of centuries-old restraints on off-exchange derivatives speculation' 24 that played a large role in the 2008 crisis.
25
Gambling was strictly regulated for centuries because it was perceived to be a social ill. The removal of derivatives from the purview of gaming laws was a major step that went largely unnoticed at the time, but was to contribute to the GFC, and to the reshaping of international financial markets.
C. The Rise in Algorithmic and High Frequency Trading and in Dark Pools
Algorithmic, 26 or computer-driven trading, drives the HFT so common in markets today. HFT accounts for about 85 per cent of US equity trading and 30-40 per cent of European and Japanese equity trading. 27 The rise in algorithmic trading in the US has been described as 'one of the fastest paradigm shifts we have seen … over the past 30 years.'
28
Dark pools are trading pools maintained by the major banks and trading platforms into which they direct most of their clients' trading, and upon which they typically only report net positions at day's end. 23 Algorithmic HFT has been justified on the grounds that it provides liquidity to the market, reduces costs and commissions, provides anonymity and control, allows access to various markets, improves price discovery, and takes out the human factor to allow for faster processing without emotional involvement. 29 Recent research suggests that HFT improves liquidity and informational efficiency, but increases volatility, and not the sort of volatility that follows faster price discovery, but rather the sort associated with a decline in market quality.
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Dark pools are justified on the grounds that they provide a way of confidentially purchasing large blocks of equity without causing 'information leakage' and without triggering a movement in the price of the equity, and also provide cost savings by avoiding exchange fees, and profit opportunities and price improvements. HFT as one of the principal causes of the crash.
D. The Change in Banks and Bankers
If a lawyer from 1970 was brought forward in time and put in a modern day courtroom, most things would be familiar: the solemnity, the architecture of the court room, the mode of dress (at least in the Supreme Court of New South Wales), the procedure, the objections being made by counsel. Since 1970 the manner of lawyers, the way they carry themselves, the way they are trained, the way they think and look backwards to find authority for what they propose doing, has all changed very little. Indeed, a lawyer transported forward in time from 17 th century
England would likewise see much in a courtroom today that they might recognise. 43 Yet if a banker from 1970 was brought forward in time to 2013 and placed in a modern investment bank, or in the investment banking arm of a commercial bank, much would seem profoundly different.
The first and major difference would be in the people. The manner of bankers, the way they carry themselves, the way they are trained, the way they see the world, all this has changed profoundly. Bankers in 1970 had basic arithmetic. One needed some maths to run a bank, but it was mostly primary school maths, not the calculus and trigonometry of high school. Today most young bankers are highly trained in maths and quantitative skills. Their degrees are in highly quantitative and mathematical finance and economics, or in maths or physics. 
E. The Rise of the Ratings Agencies
The ratings agencies played a central role in the lead-up to the GFC; perhaps the central role.
Collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) were opaque in the extreme and investors en masse substituted their rating, and the reputation of the bank selling them, for a true appraisal of the risks they embodied. The complexity and opacity of most CDOs meant that disclosure, as an organising market principle, broke down. Investors did not fully understand the risks they were buying, especially when the products became as sophisticated as CDOs of CDOs. 47 Ratings ruled, and the ratings were deeply flawed.
48
Ratings agencies commenced business in the US in 1909. 49 They rose in prominence along with the US bond market, but as that market matured and became very low risk, the need for them waned. had become small and relatively moribund; the U.S. bond market was too safe for them to matter much, and the rest of the world generated little business.'
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Then in the early 1970s a profound change occurred in how ratings agencies earned their money. 51 Their business model had always been to sell their reports to investors, those who were about to base an investment upon them. Under this model, those who were paying for the reports had a strong interest in their accuracy and prudence. In the 1970s the agencies moved to charging the entity being rated or the entity about to issue the debt to be rated.
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With this change, the agencies expanded in size, slowly at first, and then dramatically. As
Partnoy wrote in 1999, 'The number of credit rating agency employees has multiplied more than ten-fold during the past decade.' On his figures by 1995, 'S&P had … a total staff of 1,200;
Moody's … a total staff of 1,700.' 53 Today S&P has 6000 employees 54 and Moody's has 10,000.
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Because the agencies needed the repeat business of these companies, the new system of being paid meant the agencies were in a position of conflict-their duties to investors conflicted with their own pecuniary interests. Suddenly the entity paying for the rating had a strong interest in the rating being as favourable as possible, as a higher rating of course meant lower borrowing costs. This conflict was compounded in the lead-up to the GFC with the rapid rise in structured finance products. certain financial structure to a ratings agency and ask what rating they would give it, and if the rating was lower than desired, what needed to be done to the product to elevate the rating. Hence the agencies became heavily involved in the design of individual products. 56 After weeks or months of negotiation, when these products were finally presented for a rating, the agency's hands were largely tied by its earlier advice, and it was not seeing the product with fresh eyes, at all.
The Dodd-Frank Act contains multiple amendments to the law relating to ratings agencies, but none that go to the heart of the matter-none that eradicate this core conflict. 57 The EU regulations go further than the US ones, but still do not eradicate this core conflict.
Coffee suggests that any reforms relating to credit rating agencies need to acknowledge three simple truths: (i) the 'issuer pays' business model invites the sacrifice of reputational capital in return for high current revenues; (ii) ratings competition is good, except when it is bad; and (iii) in a buoyant, rapidly rising market, no one, including investors, may have a strong interest in learning the truth. He concludes that only a strong and highly motivated watchdog can offset this process of repression and self-delusion. 58 Coffee argues that reform that fails to address the 'issuer pays' business model 'amounts to re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, The ratings agencies' historical business model was the right one. Being paid by the entity being rated gives rise to the enormous temptation to issue higher ratings to win repeat business. The best reform in this area would be to wind back the clock 45 years.
The Perils of Thinking Small, the Need to Think Big
Lawyers generally think small. It is a lawyer's job to attend to details. Legal training teaches lawyers to look backwards to find authority for propositions. In what other professional field do professionals look back to what might have been said a century ago to discern the answer to a contemporary issue? To do so in engineering or science, psychology or education, accounting or economics, would be to attract quizzical glances from colleagues if not their outright derision.
Lawyers do it all the time.
So doubtless part of the responsibility for the small thinking in response to the GFC must be laid at lawyers' feet. Involve lawyers in reforms and one is likely to get moderate, incremental reforms. Lawyers stand for the status quo in many ways. Legal training reinforces this tendency, and lawyers' contributions in maintaining the rule of law and a vibrant economic system is considerable as a result. 60 Coffee defines the 'subscriber pays' model as one that requires institutional investors to obtain their own ratings from a ratings agency not retained by the issuer or underwriter before they purchase the debt securities: ibid 33.
The principal reforms being pursued in most markets are worthwhile, but insufficiently fundamental. We are attempting to respond in careful, measured, incremental ways to fundamental changes. This is unlikely to work.
The globalisation of a system that was expressly designed to be national is a seismic shift. The fact it started in the 1970s, a long time ago now, makes it no less seismic. The legalisation of financial gambling is another major, fundamental shift, as are the rise in algorithmic and HFT, the advent of dark pools, and the fundamentally different types of people going into banking today. These are fundamental changes that require a rethinking of the entire system.
Such thinking must address questions such as how large and profitable we wish financial sectors to be. Is it in the UK's interests to have so much of the economy dominated by the finance industry, and the ancillary industries (law and accounting, etc)? There are some potential responses to such issues, however, and they don't tend to be a reworking of technical rules aimed at enhancing disclosure. Such responses include (i) a sovereign bankruptcy regime to respond to the globalisation of the international financial system; (ii) higher mandated capital levels for banks; (iii) levies on banks; (iv) a tax on financial transactions to reduce the size of the financial system and make it more risk-averse; (v) regulating strongly HFT and dark pools; and (iv) removing the conflict in the role of the ratings agencies.
A. A System to Deal with Sovereign Bankruptcy
Smith identified the clear need for a sovereign bankruptcy regime over 200 years ago, in these terms:
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor. Faced with a nation in crisis, the IMF simply has too few policy options at its disposal.
The IMF can continue lending or stop lending to the debtor. If the nation's problems include an unsustainable debt burden, more debt will only make matters worse. Yet if the IMF stops lending, the debtor will usually be forced to default, and lose access to capital, and capital markets more generally may be destabilised. 63 Traditionally these crises were the preserve of In writing about sovereign bankruptcy, Smith meant something quite different from corporate or personal bankruptcy. A sovereign nation cannot go out of business, and its assets cannot be liquidated and distributed among creditors. Sovereign bankruptcy would involve a stay of execution by creditors while the procedure was in process, and would result in the determination of an amount of debt relief that would, after it had been effected, leave the debtor able to continue to service its remaining debts and afford to its people their basic human rights.
The term sovereign bankruptcy is therefore used, in the literature, as a shorthand for a formal procedure conducted according to rules that would result in a degree of mandated debt relief. Sovereign bankruptcy would thus lead to much the same type of result as the long, protracted rescheduling negotiations which are currently the norm, viz the debt would be cancelled in part and the balance rescheduled. The differences are that the level of cancellation might be higher, as the debtors have little power in the current negotiations, and the outcome would be determined by an independent forum, not by the parties, and according to prescribed rules. In short the process should be fairer, swifter and more certain than that which prevails today.
The principal purposes of a personal bankruptcy system are generally seen to be to divide the assets of an insolvent debtor fairly and rateably between its creditors and allow an insolvent debtor the opportunity to make a fresh start free. The four objectives of corporate insolvency law are generally seen as restoring the company to profitable trading if possible, maximising returns to creditors, providing a fair and equitable system for the ranking of claims, and identifying the causes of company failures and imposing sanctions for culpable management. thus make the economy more stable. This effect can be termed the 'systemic' aspect of a bankruptcy regime-for without a bankruptcy regime, any economy will, as a system, be unstable.
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The fairness aspects of bankruptcy are important. Internationally their absence has cost millions of lives in developing countries. However the systemic advantages of a bankruptcy system are arguably more important at the international level. This is because the more immediate risk of loss for creditors with a sovereign bankruptcy regime in place would tend to moderate capital flows to developing countries. The real prospect of massive loan losses always sharpens bankers' minds. These systemic advantages would help ensure that the capital flows are more appropriate to the needs and capacities to repay of debtors. Financial crises would thus be less frequent and less severe because crises are so often the result of excessive inflows in preceding years. 67 Furthermore, in the event of a crisis, the workout would proceed more rapidly and efficiently and thus the workout costs to creditors and debtors would be reduced. nations are repaid at the expense of the most basic human rights of their own citizens. Latin
American nations still service debt incurred in the 1970s. That debt has been restructured, reduced, and transformed into Brady bonds, which are still some 15 years away from being fully repaid. 69 Debt is a lifetime sentence for poor countries. There is still something very like debtors' prisons for highly indebted nations, as Greece and Spain are now beginning to learn.
The comprehensive approach would be to establish a standing sovereign bankruptcy court by treaty. A more achievable approach, in the near term, would be to establish an ad hoc tribunal for each case. In either case, the body would need to apply an agreed set of rules and
procedure. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal could be established quickly if implemented by agreement between the creditors and a nation in difficulty.
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The two principal models generally considered as the basis for any sovereign bankruptcy regime are Chapters 9 and 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 71 Chapter 11 is better known than Chapter 9 and, perhaps for this reason, commentators often consider Chapter 11 when looking for a precedent for a sovereign bankruptcy regime. However, the issues that arise in the bankruptcy of a nation are closer to those of a local government than a corporation. For these reasons, Chapter 9 is the best place to start, as it governs the bankruptcy of local government and Vulture funds are well named as their behavior is amoral. The lenders with the strongest claim to repayment are those that lent the full amount to Argentina in the first place not those that bought it later for a small fraction of its face value. The US court decisions siding with the vulture fund imperil all future sovereign debt restructuring. Why would any creditor now agree to a substantial haircut on their debts when, if they simply hold out, they may eventually recover the full face value?
The informal procedures that govern the restructuring of sovereign indebtedness have been largely settled for over 30 years. US courts upholding the rights of vulture funds throws this settled procedure into disarray and provides the impetus for a formal bankruptcy regime under which a tribunal would decide the amount of debt that needs to be written off and the amount that can be serviced. The US courts got this wrong because the sovereign context is utterly different from that of loans within the US. When banks lend to developing country sovereigns they do so knowing the sovereign typically has no foreign assets over which execution can be levied; that the loan is completely unsecured; and that history suggests it may well at some point need to be written down in value. Knowing all this, banks still do the business because it is profitable. Such loans are governed by New York or English law because there is no other law available. However, these domestic debt recovery laws assume the existence of a bankruptcy process, and assume the ability to levy execution over the assets of such a debtor-two factors notably absent in the sovereign context. While the US vulture fund litigation precipitated the General Assembly vote, as explored above, limiting the activities of vulture funds is not the main reason the world needs a sovereign insolvency regime. The principal reason why such a regime is needed is that no financial system works well without one. Every domestic financial system in the world has a bankruptcy regime to allocate losses between debtors and creditors upon debtor insolvency. Such regimes sharpen the mind of creditors and work against over-lending and over-borrowing. Their absence, on the international scene, is a principal reason commercial banks consistently over-lend to poor countries-they know poor countries will service the debt by raising taxes and decreasing social services, usually to the point of infringing the fundamental human rights of the poorest of their own people.
The reason for the absence of a sovereign bankruptcy regime is that there was never supposed to be a global financial system. When the US and the UK designed the post-war international financial system in 1944, the intention was to promote global trade but keep finance national. 77 If the architects of the system had intended a global financial system, they would have established a global financial regulator and a global insolvency regime because no domestic financial system works effectively without these two institutions. The system they established worked well from after WWII to the early 1970s when the US went off the gold standard, the fixed exchange rate regime fell apart, and a global financial system began to emerge. 78 Ever since, we have had a global financial system missing a critical piece of institutional infrastructure.
There is still a long way to go on this journey. A vote to begin negotiations for a treaty is a long way short of agreeing to the terms of a sovereign bankruptcy process and having the treaty implemented by a sufficient number of countries. But the vote is nonetheless a vitally important first step in remedying a major piece that has been missing from the international financial to be worked out. 79 But Chapter 9 would be a good place to start. A modified form of what works for municipal governments in the US should work far better than our current arrangements for the poorer nations of the world. In current sovereign debt renegotiations, the IMF tends to severely limit the budgetary expenditures of debtor nations, 80 despite considerable evidence that overly restrictive fiscal settings are not conducive to economic growth in developing countries. 81 It should not be surprising that adjudication under a predetermined set of rules by an independent forum should produce a fairer and more certain and predictable outcome than the unregulated negotiations that resolve these issues today. Developed and developing nations, and the international financial system, would all be best served by a carefully crafted set of bankruptcy rules, modelled on Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Law, and applied and enforced pursuant to a treaty.
B. Higher Mandated Capital Levels for Banks
Banks with higher levels of capital are safer. Given the burden that bail-outs of banks imposed on government balance sheets in 2009 one might expect governments to now require banks to hold substantially more capital, to mitigate the risk of further bail-outs being necessary, and because some European nations lack the fiscal capacity to repeat the performance. This very thin capitalisation of financial institutions is one of the main reasons why widespread insolvency became a very real possibility after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, as financial institutions were simply too leveraged to absorb their losses, and deep systemic interconnections meant that problems at one financial institution invariably and almost immediately became a problem for other financial institutions. In contrast, Apple, one of the largest US companies by market capitalisation, has virtually no debt and operates purely on its own capital. 85 Most industrial companies have debt levels that are, by banking standards, incredibly low. Higher levels of capital would therefore make a bank's debt and equity safer, with the result that the cost to the bank of both its debt and equity will be lower as both lenders to and investors in the bank will accept lower returns in exchange for this lower risk. In
Murphy's words:
Basel III and related initiatives such as the G-SIFI charges have dramatically increased the quality and quantity of capital that banks-especially large banks-are required to hold. Clearly a bank with more common equity tier 1 capital can absorb more losses before becoming insolvent, and hence these changes can be seen as enhancing financial stability.
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Bank capital may therefore not be as expensive to banks as has been claimed, and it certainly reduces the costs to society of financial instability.
For these and many other reasons, Admati and Hellwig establish that banks could have much higher capital levels without it denting their profitability significantly or requiring the passing on of substantially higher costs to customers. The reliance on high debt levels, and conversely, low capital levels, by banks is in the quest to maximise profits in an environment in which the losses can be socialised. Once the social and economic costs of financial crisis are factored in the 'cost of capital' argument diminishes. This is the approach that has been taken in Switzerland. A quantitative study of the costs of the higher capital requirements to the Swiss economy and banking sector found that:
the long-run social benefits of substantially higher capital requirements are large and are far greater than the social costs. The increase of capital levels as foreseen by Basel III and the Swiss Too Big to Fail (TBTF) regulations will accordingly reduce the probability of systemic crisis by 3.6% and yield an expected permanent annual GDP benefit of 0.64%. Thus, social benefits exceed social costs by a factor of nearly 86 D Murphy, 'Maintaining Confidence' (Special Paper 216, LSE Financial Markets Group Paper Series, December 2012) 11-12. Murphy goes on to propose how in a perverse sense more capital may not make banks any safer, a proposition with which I disagree, but which is at least reasoned.
11. Even if we take into account that the cost-benefit calculations are subject to estimation errors, the sheer difference between social costs and benefits is huge and should be recognized in the debate about the costs and benefits of the new regulations in Switzerland.
87
The authors list studies in other countries that have produced similar results. 88 Banks are currently run on such high amounts of leverage and low amounts of capital because it enables them to maximise short-term profits without having to ensure that they have adequate provisioning to cover losses during an economic downturn or market crisis. They know that should they fail, the taxpayers will bail them out-a moral hazard problem which has been made substantially worse by the crisis. Our present capital structures for contemporary banks are a shining example of moral hazard in action.
To mitigate this moral hazard, Switzerland applies a 'Swiss finish' to its SIFIs that higher standards of their banks in various areas. Switzerland's lead on these matters is one that many countries would do well to follow. 90 
C. Bank Levies
The IMF has recommended that governments impose a levy on the assets of their financial institutions. In its words, '[e]xpecting taxpayers to support the [financial] sector during bad times while allowing owners, managers, and/or creditors of financial institutions to enjoy the gains of good times misallocates resources and undermines long-term growth.' 91 France, Germany, and the UK imposed levies in early 2011 for four reasons: (i) to recoup some of the costs of bailing out their financial sectors in the wake of the GFC; (ii) to accumulate funds so that future bailouts are funded by banks rather than taxpayers; (iii) to shrink the size of financial sectors that have grown too large in part due to being under-taxed; and (iv) to discourage risky behaviour in banks. 92 There is a strong argument that financial sectors in some countries are too large and profitable and consume a disproportionate amount of the financial and human capital in those countries. Stiglitz believes 'in many countries, the financial system had grown too large; it had ceased to be a means to an end and had become an end in itself.' 93 Turner said 'the whole financial system has grown bigger than is socially optimal … [f]rom the point of view of Britain as a whole we have over-relied on the City and we need other dynamic sectors'. 94 per cent of trading on US financial markets is algorithmically driven and the assets acquired are typically held for very short periods of time, often measurable in seconds.
In 2011 the European Commission voted to implement an FTT in the EU by early 2018.
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In January 2013, the EU voted to allow 11 countries to implement an FTT much sooner. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia,
propriety, but has the benefit of incentivising simplicity in transactional design which should in turn increase the efficacy of securities regulation.
If the G20 really wants to address the move in our financial markets towards ever-higher frequencies of trading, and wants to encourage accuracy in pricing, and thus promote the most important form of market efficiency, allocative efficiency, an FTT may be the way to go, and it will be fascinating to see if the 11 EU nations that have said they will implement a FTT actually do so in 2015.
E. A Stronger Response to High Frequency Trading and Dark Pools
The approaches of regulators to HFT and dark pools have varied quite widely. The approaches of four jurisdictions are considered next. The UK is not considered as it had not, at the time of writing, responded substantively to these developments. into more opaque pools.
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A change in the MiFID regime is currently pending, with the European Parliament passing the Commission's proposal for a new directive and a new regulation, known together as MiFID II, due for implementation in January 2017. 110 The text awaits approval by the Council at the time of writing. If passed, the new regime will take a more cautious regulatory stance towards dark pools. Although dark pools will still be legal, they will be subject to stricter regulation.
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Investment firms running an internal matching system that operates on a multilateral basis will have to be authorised as a 'Multilateral Trading Facility.' 112 To avoid a negative impact on the price formation process, trading in a financial instrument that benefits from reference price waivers or negotiated price waivers will be subject to a volume cap on that trading venue of 4 per cent of the total volume of trading in that financial instrument on all trading venues across the Union over the previous 12 months. In addition, a maximum of 8 per cent of the total volume of trading on all trading venues in the past 12 months across the Union can take place under such waivers. 113 The use of a reference price waiver also comes with a price improvement mechanism that requires orders to be matched at the midpoint within the current 108 ibid. 109 Foucault, Pagano and Röell (n 33) 299. In addition to requirements for venues and volume caps on certain pre-trade transparency waivers MiFID II will introduce new controls for algorithmic trading. 116 All algorithmic traders will need to be properly regulated and, if pursuing a market-making strategy, will need to provide liquidity. In addition, investment firms that provide direct electronic access to a trading venue will need to put in place systems and risk controls, such a circuit breakers when there is unexpected price volatility, so as to avoid trading that contributes to a disorderly market or involves market abuse. 117 Traders who apply HFT techniques are also expressly included in the directive, with no possibility of exemption. 118 The European Parliament, however, had to give up its demand of a minimum resting period of 500 milliseconds, which would have severely impacted HFT. 119 As part of the regulation of HFT, the proposed directive also provides that trading venues will have to provide access to co-location services on a non-discriminatory, fair 114 
(iii) Australia
In recent years, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has taken a stronger stance on dark liquidity, automated trading and HFT. New rules require markets to pause trading when automated trading causes extreme price movements, require brokers to have a 'kill switch' in place, and subject dark trading to a price improvement rule compared to lit venues and to block trading thresholds for pre-trade transparency.
In March 2013, the ASIC released a report and a consultation paper on dark liquidity and HFT, 129 which was followed by the release of new rules in August 2013. 130 The new rules target mainly dark pool liquidity rather than HFT. This was to be expected as the report on dark liquidity and HFT found HFT to have no impact on price formation, liquidity and execution costs in Australia. 131 To the extent that new rules are put in place to deal with HFT, it is to avoid manipulative practices. 132 As in the EU, a 500 milliseconds resting time for orders (only of $500 or less) had been proposed to reduce excessive noise, but was not implemented following consultation as the costs of systems development to make this happen would have allegedly exceeded the benefit from doing it.
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The new rules on dark pools provide for enhanced crossing system transparency and disclosure, fair treatment, monitoring and system controls. Conflict of interest obligations will also be enhanced, and order flow incentives will be put in place.
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Also worth noting in the Australian context is the ASIC regulatory guide on electronic trading that provides guidance for market participants' obligations for the use of automated order processing that includes situations where orders are directed to crossing systems.
(iv) Canada
In April 2012, Canadian regulatory authorities, CSA and IIROC, introduced new rules on dark pools that entered into force in October that year. 136 These rules require that 'an order entered on a marketplace must trade with visible orders on that marketplace at the same price before trading with dark orders at the same price on that marketplace.' 137 Visible orders thus receive priority over dark orders. 138 Moreover, smaller orders that trade with dark orders must receive a better price, which is defined in the regulation as one trading increment or half an increment if the spread between bid and ask is only one increment. 139 As a result of these rules, trading in dark the regulation. 140 The IIROC has also issued a guidance note that helps explain when AT or HFT amounts to manipulative or deceptive trading.
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These Canadian rules, that prefer lit over dark markets, and focus on price, have had the greatest impact of any adopted to date to deal with dark pools. The key issue with respect to HFT and dark pools is the frame in which one views them. If the good being pursued is liquidity, then both should be welcomed, as they initially were. If the good is transparency, each is deeply problematic as each development works directly to substantially lessen transparency in the market.
There has developed something of a reverence for capital markets innovations, and to read the many defences of algorithmic HFT one would begin to think that markets didn't function at all acceptably before its institution in the mid-to-late 1980s. But of course that is not the case. Part of this reverence arises from the misplaced belief that more liquidity is always good. It is a belief consistent with much thinking today-if something is good, more of it must be better. When it comes to liquidity in markets this is simply not always true. Yet in any discussion with industry participants or regulators the proposal of any measure that would reduce liquidity is treated like a social gaffe. It stops the discussion. Yet there is much woolly thinking around liquidity, and efficiency, for that matter. Certainly algorithmic HFT contributes little, if any, real security of supply in a market.
So regulatory measures that bear harshly upon HFT or dark pools are not threatening something central to the functioning of a good market, genuine liquidity, and such measures are warranted for HFT and dark pools both directly threaten something critical to the functioning of a good market-genuine transparency.
F. Deconflicting the Ratings Agencies
There are three possible solutions to the rating agency problem. The best is to move back to the old model in which the user of the rating pays for it, not the entity being rated. This would be a sea-change, and a good one, but its implementation would require considerable political courage.
An alternative is to remove the ratings agencies as far as possible from the formal financial regulatory process. At the moment the adoption of ratings in the very fabric of the Basel capital accords gives them a central role which needs to change. The third and final approach is that taken in the so-called Franken Amendment, named after Al Franken, one of the two Senators promoting it. Under this amendment, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would establish an independent panel that would assign the ratings of structured products (not of companies or sovereigns) to the rating agency that the panel believed was best equipped to provide the rating. The incentive to provide a favourable rating to continue to get this issuer's business, at least for structured products, would thereby be removed, and there would seem no good reason for the amendment to not be extended to bonds and companies themselves. At the time of writing, the SEC is undertaking a further study into how conflicts of interest can be avoided, short of instituting the Franken Amendment.
144
This approach is attractive in part because Al Franken spent 15 years of his career as one of the founding writers for the US television show 'Saturday Night Live', and has also written a script for a comedy movie. In medieval times part of the role of the court jester was to tell the truth to the King-telling the truth to power was too dangerous an occupation in those times unless the truth was wrapped in humour. 145 Franken is perhaps a modern day jester who is again
In the immediate aftermath of the GFC, the UN asked Stiglitz to head a Commission into the international financial system. 146 Its report was informed by a 'new' type of thinking. The first of Stiglitz's 'Principles for a New Financial Architecture' is:
Financial markets are not an end in themselves, but a means: they are supposed to perform certain vital functions which enable the real economy to be more productive: (c) Managing Risk, transferring it from those less able to bear it to those more able.
It is hard to have a well-performing modern economy without a good financial system.
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The GFC was a direct result of treating the creation of financial products as an end in itself-as a valuable driver of economic growth independent of the products' effects. The reforms initiated by most major nations at the behest of the G20 to date have been worthwhile, necessary and helpful; but they have been insufficiently fundamental to address the major systemic changes of the past 40 years. None of the reforms initiated by the G20 have challenged the way of thinking that sees financial markets as an end in themselves and not merely a means to support the real economy.
In this sense, the reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to avert another global financial crisis. Higher mandatory capital levels, levies on banks, the removal of the conflict of interest that compromises all credit ratings today, a financial transactions tax, and a far tougher approach 
